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ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS: EVALUATING 
PROPOSALS FOR CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM 
Kelly Milliron* 
Abstract 
Civil asset forfeiture compromises criminal due process protections 
for the sake of allowing the government to take property from citizens 
and pocket the profits. Within the last decade, several news outlets have 
reported instances where law enforcement agencies took property from 
citizens—without arresting or convicting them—and spent the proceeds 
from seized cash, homes, or vehicles on their own agencies. Because the 
government is often only required to prove that the property was 
associated with criminal activity by a preponderance of the evidence, 
many citizens are left without the resources or ability to defend their 
property, even when they are innocent. As a national movement builds 
toward challenging and reforming civil forfeiture laws, this Note 
evaluates existing reforms as implemented in some states and as proposed 
to state legislatures in others. This Note explores the viability of four 
major proposals for civil forfeiture reform. Without abolishing civil 
forfeiture altogether, these proposals could enhance due process 
protection for individuals fighting forfeitures. These proposals could also 
prevent the government from using civil forfeiture to make a profit rather 
than to achieve civil forfeiture’s original purpose: compensation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
At 3:20 a.m., a police officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and 
following another vehicle too closely.1 During the stop, the driver 
consented to a search of his vehicle and the officer found a safe in the 
trunk.2 The driver said the safe belonged to his mother and contained 
money, but the passenger offered a different explanation. Because of this 
discrepancy, the officer acquired a warrant.3 Upon opening the safe, the 
officer discovered $201,000 and a bill of sale for a home in 
Pennsylvania.4 Suspecting that the driver obtained the money through 
drug sales, the officer confiscated the cash.5   
The scenario above represents the facts from $201,100.00 United 
States Currency v. State,6 where law enforcement successfully executed 
a civil forfeiture.7 The court in that case held that the government met its 
burden to show sufficient circumstantial evidence that the money 
constituted contraband.8 Additionally, the court held that the driver’s 
mother, who asserted that she qualified as the innocent owner of the 
property, failed to demonstrate that she had a proprietary interest in the 
money before or during the act giving rise to the forfeiture.9 The driver’s 
mother stated that she received the money when she sold her home 
several years prior and that she kept the money in a safe.10 Furthermore, 
she claimed her son transported the money back to Texas so she could 
purchase a home for him and his partner.11 And yet, the driver’s mother 
                                                                                                                     
 1. $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State, No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536 *1, *1 
(Tex. App. July 16, 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536 (Tex. App. July 16, 2016). 
 7. Id. at *1. 
 8. Id. at *2. 
 9. Id. at *4. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at *1. 
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still failed to prove she was an innocent owner of the property.12 As a 
result, she lost over $200,000 without ever being present. 
This scenario provides a classic example of how a civil forfeiture 
proceeding begins. Civil forfeiture typically occurs when a law 
enforcement officer seizes an individual’s property because she has 
probable cause to believe an individual has committed a crime, and as a 
result, she confiscates the property associated with the crime.13 A civil 
forfeiture action primarily rests on the legal fiction that the property itself 
is the offender.14 The government brings an action against the property 
and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was 
used to commit or facilitate a crime.15  
In response, the owner of the property may assert an “innocent 
ownership” affirmative defense.16 This defense requires the owner to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that at the time the illegal 
conduct took place, the owner did not know of the conduct; or (2) that 
upon learning of the illegal conduct, the owner did all that could be 
reasonably expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the 
property.17 If the owner is unable to meet this requirement, the 
government will keep the seized property.18 The government may also 
confiscate property through criminal forfeiture, which occurs when an 
individual is convicted of a crime and the government takes any property 
or “ill-gotten gains” tied to the criminal activity.19 Civil and criminal 
forfeiture proceedings may be brought in tandem in an attempt to ensure 
that the government successfully acquires a defendant’s property even if 
the prosecutor fails to secure a conviction.20 
The driver’s mother in $201,100.00 attempted to bring the case to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, but the Court denied certiorari 
because she failed to properly preserve her due process argument.21 
However, in a statement regarding the denial, Justice Thomas questioned 
whether modern civil forfeiture practices remain justified by their 
historical roots.22 In his statement, Justice Thomas touched on some of 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at *4. 
 13. See Kenneth Kandaras, Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee 
a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 195, 195–96 (1981); see also Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602, 604 (1993) (providing an example of the government confiscating property associated 
with the crime). 
 14. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.  
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2012).  
 16. Id. § 983(d). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. § 983(a)(1)(F). 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012). 
 20. Janeice T. Martin, Note, Final Jeopardy: Merging the Civil and Criminal Rounds in the 
Punishment Game, 46 FLA. L. REV. 661, 661 (1994). 
 21. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (statement on the denial of certiorari). 
 22. Id. 
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the issues that have plagued the continually changing practice and 
reformation of civil forfeiture.23 Specifically, Justice Thomas noted how 
civil forfeiture lacks certain procedural protections compared to criminal 
law, that civil forfeiture proceedings have become highly profitable for 
law enforcement agencies, and that civil forfeiture frequently targets the 
poor or other groups who are incapable of adequately defending their 
property.24 Most crucially, Justice Thomas discussed how modern 
forfeiture laws have potentially expanded beyond the scope of their 
historical justifications and how it is questionable if the historical 
practices justify forfeiture actions proceeding civilly at all.25   
Part I of this Note will explore the complex and turbulent history of 
civil forfeiture law, which has led to concerns over the government’s use 
of civil forfeiture as a powerful tool for profit. In Part II, this Note will 
examine legislative actions since 2000 that signal the potential for change 
in civil forfeiture law. Part III of this Note will then evaluate the major 
solutions that have been proposed to address the due process concerns 
stemming from civil forfeiture and analyze the arguments behind each 
solution.  
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
The United States’ civil forfeiture roots extend deep into English 
common law.26 Historically, if property caused a person’s death, the 
property could be forfeited to the Crown.27 When a man died, the Crown 
brought suit against the object that caused his death. Because the object 
was to be given to God—and because the Crown stepped in on behalf of 
God—the object would be deposited with the Crown for the Crown’s 
use.28 The forfeited property would then be spent for the good of the 
King’s soul.29 Although many characteristics of forfeiture as it existed 
under English common law remain relics of the past, modern forfeiture 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 848 (“This system—where police can seize property with limited judicial 
oversight and retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses.”).  
 24. Id. at 847–48 (“Civil proceedings often lack certain procedural protections that 
accompany criminal proceedings, such as the right to a jury trial and a heightened standard of 
proof.”).   
 25. Id. at 849 (“[I]t is unclear whether courts historically permitted forfeiture actions to 
proceed civilly in all respects. Some of this Court's early cases suggested that forfeiture actions 
were in the nature of criminal proceedings.”).   
 26. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993); United States v. U.S. Coin & 
Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1971); United States v. One 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp. 
495, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  
 27. See One 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp. at 498; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 27 (Paulo J. S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran eds. 2011) (1881) (describing an 
example where a man fell from a ship, the ship’s motion caused the man’s death, and  the ship 
was the guilty vehicle subject to forfeiture).   
 28. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 25–26. 
 29. Id. 
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is still premised on the legal fiction that inanimate objects themselves can 
be guilty of wrongdoing.30 In colonial America, forfeiture actions were 
commonly brought against ships—in response to criminal acts like piracy 
or in situations where a ship caused someone’s death—although it was 
impractical to seek out the foreign party who owned the offending 
vessel.31 Although the government intended to use forfeitures as a 
mechanism for compensation, especially as forfeitures continued 
throughout the 1800s, the government also sought, in part, to punish 
criminals by confiscating their property.32 However, with the exception 
of a brief spike in forfeitures during the Prohibition Era, civil forfeiture 
actions remained relatively dormant until the early 1970s when the 
economic and criminal landscapes of America changed.33  
The War on Drugs reignited government use of civil forfeitures.34 
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970,35 the government gained the power 
to seize property used or intended to be used in the commission of a drug 
offense punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.36 This Act 
helped launch the War on Drugs by targeting instrumentalities, proceeds, 
and other real property associated with drug crimes.37 Additionally, in 
1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act38 established the 
Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to receive the proceeds of 
forfeitures and to pay the costs associated with forfeitures, including the 
managing and disposing of property, satisfying valid liens, mortgages, 
other innocent owner claims, and costs associated with accomplishing the 
                                                                                                                     
 30. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 720. 
 31. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 29. 
 32. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827) (“But the practice has been, and so this Court 
understand[s] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly 
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.”); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig 
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 210 (1844) (“[T]o protect the commerce of the United States and 
punish the crime of piracy, any armed vessel . . . may be condemned and sold, the proceeds 
whereof to be distributed between the United States and the captors, at the discretion of the court.” 
(emphasis added)).   
 33. See Walter J. Van Eck, Note, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 449, 449 (1990). 
 34. Alan Nicgorski, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the “War on Drugs,” and the 
Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 374, 381–82 (1996) (describing how civil forfeiture was designed as a weapon to end the 
narcotics trade). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 (2012)).  
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2012). 
 37. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 376. 
 38. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.).  
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legal forfeiture of the property.39 Furthermore, the 1984 Act empowered 
the Attorney General to use the funds to pay for any necessary operations 
associated with forfeiture proceedings, as well as general investigative 
expenses.40   
As a result, civil forfeiture exploded throughout the 1980s. Drug 
offense arrests increased drastically and law enforcement began seizing 
large amounts of property.41 As the amount of forfeited assets increased, 
law enforcement agencies pocketed more proceeds.42 Equitable sharing 
programs also increased in popularity—these programs allowed state law 
enforcement agencies to keep large shares of the profits from forfeited 
property if they participated in investigations or the turnover of forfeited 
property to the federal government.43 As civil forfeiture rapidly became 
both more popular and more impactful,44 the judiciary faced more 
questions about the legal ramifications of and the protections in civil 
forfeiture actions, particularly with regard to the Excessive Fines Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
Austin v. United States45 became the first landmark case to hold that 
the Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil forfeiture actions.46 In Austin, 
the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of cocaine possession with the 
intent to distribute, and the government subsequently brought an in rem 
action against the defendant’s mobile home and body shop.47 During the 
commission of the crime, the defendant left his body shop, went to his 
mobile home, and then returned to the body shop with cocaine, which he 
later sold to someone else.48 While searching the body shop and the 
mobile home, law enforcement found drugs, drug paraphernalia, a gun, 
and cash.49 In response to the in rem action, the defendant argued that the 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Asset Forfeiture Program, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund 
[https://perma.cc/95H5-GWLY].  
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2012) (authorizing the enumeration of these powers and the use of 
assets).  
 41. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 376 (“With such strong support from the highest levels of 
authority, the value of the assets seized by the federal government in the war on drugs has 
skyrocketed since the Department of Justice established the National Assets Seizure and 
Forfeiture Fund in 1985.”). 
 42. Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1732 (2015) (“Since 
2001, local police have seized over $2.5 billion through the federal statute, 81% of which came 
from people who were not charged with a crime. Police used this revenue to pay for everything 
from informants and weaponry to publicity efforts . . . and luxury vehicles.” (footnote omitted)). 
 43. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 105 (2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/839521/download [https://perma.cc/58Y5-L3W6]. 
 44. Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It 
Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 325–26 (2017). 
 45. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
 46. Id. at 604. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 605. 
 49. Id. 
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forfeiture of the mobile home and body shop violated the Eighth 
Amendment.50 The Court agreed and held that the Excessive Fines Clause 
applied to statutory in rem forfeitures because the forfeiture, at least in 
part, served a punitive purpose.51  
Although forfeiture can serve a remedial purpose by removing 
dangerous items or contraband from society, the Austin Court conceded 
that the defendant’s mobile home and body shop were not criminal 
instruments of the drug trade, so the act of forfeiting them did not 
constitute compensation.52 This case opened the door for potential 
constitutional violations and resultant protection for individuals subject 
to civil proceedings. However, the Court refused to provide a specific 
standard for measuring when a civil forfeiture action violates the 
Excessive Fines Clause.53 After Austin, without a concrete standard, the 
lower courts attempted to define the test for potential violations.54 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States did not reenter the 
conversation until United States v. Bajakajian.55 
Bajakajian marked the first time the Court struck down a forfeiture 
action or fine as unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.56 
Bajakajian involved a criminal forfeiture where a defendant attempted to 
leave the United States without reporting, as required by federal law, that 
he was transporting more than $10,000 in currency.57 The defendant 
pleaded guilty to the failure to report and sought a bench trial with regard 
to the forfeiture.58 The lower court held that the $357,144 the defendant 
carried was subject to forfeiture because the currency was “involved in” 
the offense.59 On appeal, the defendant argued that the full forfeiture was 
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.60 The Court 
agreed.61 The Court also engaged in a discussion regarding how the 
Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil in rem proceedings because “[a] 
forfeiture that reaches beyond this strict historical limitation is ipso facto 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 618. 
 52. Id. at 621. 
 53. Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standard for 
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1596–97 (1999). 
 54. Shiely, supra note 53, at 1597 (“[T]he lower courts have had to determine what 
analytical framework to use. Without guidance from the Supreme Court, inconsistent standards 
among the lower courts have been inevitable. Therefore, the extent to which the Excessive Fines 
Clause may provide relief from civil forfeiture remains untested.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 55. 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
 56. Id. at 334.  
 57. Id. at 324. 
 58. Id. at 325. 
 59. Id. at 325–26. 
 60. Id. at 324. 
 61. Id. 
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punitive and therefore subject to review under the Excessive Fines 
Clause.”62  
Some scholars questioned if this analysis, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, actually loosened the restraints on the government in 
civil forfeiture proceedings, because the Bajakajian Court seemingly 
allowed civil forfeiture to be used for the sole purpose of imposing 
punishment.63 As such, the government could essentially bypass the 
fundamental procedural protections found in criminal forfeiture—such as 
the right to counsel and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard—to 
impose a harsher, swifter punishment. And this punishment would be 
constitutional unless it was grossly disproportionate to the punishment 
that would have been imposed in a criminal proceeding.64 The uncertain 
nature of the analysis in Bajakajian further kindled concerns about the 
uncertainty surrounding the implementation and enforcement of civil 
forfeiture actions.  
By the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of the United 
States had answered several crucial questions about the constitutional 
nature of civil forfeiture actions65—specifically that civil forfeiture could 
serve a punitive purpose66—but the Court left much for the lower courts 
and state legislatures to decipher. Before the lower courts began to 
substantially interpret the new holdings, the federal legislature swiftly 
stepped in to reform federal civil forfeiture law.67 This reform directly 
affected all state law enforcement agencies, and the legislature intended 
for it to alleviate some of the concerns surrounding the lack of due process 
protection for property owners involved in forfeiture prosecutions. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES AND CHANGES TO CIVIL 
FORFEITURE LAWS 
In response to new precedent that redefined the reach and limitations 
of civil forfeiture,68 Congress passed the Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 333 n.8. 
 63. Shiely, supra note 53, at 1632.  
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (deciding when a punitive forfeiture violates 
the Excessive Fines Clause); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (deciding that forfeiture 
is a monetary punishment and is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause). 
 66. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.  
 67. Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202 
(2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)). 
 68. United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In 
response to widespread criticism of this regime, Congress enacted CAFRA.” (citation omitted)). 
See United States v. $39,480.00 in U.S. Currency, 190 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931–32 (W.D. Tex. 2002) 
(“However, the Court is well aware that, as a general rule, forfeitures are not favored by the law 
and statutes providing for forfeitures are strictly construed.”). 
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2000 (CAFRA).69 To alleviate due process concerns. CAFRA 
significantly modified federal civil forfeiture procedures.70 CAFRA 
heightened the government’s burden of proof from a probable cause 
standard to a preponderance of the evidence standard,71 making it more 
difficult for the government to establish the criminality of property. 
CAFRA imposed another restriction on the government by requiring it to 
serve notice of a forfeiture action within sixty days.72 And CAFRA made 
several remedial reforms on the behalf of property owners, including a 
comprehensive innocent-owner-defense, whereas prior to CAFRA, 
courts did not consider the owner’s possible innocence.73 The innocent-
owner-defense allowed an owner to assert her innocent ownership over 
the property in question if she could prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that she either did not know of the conduct giving rise to the 
forfeiture, or that upon learning of conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, 
she did all that could reasonably be expected to terminate criminal use of 
her property.74 CAFRA thus altered the burden-shifting model so that 
both the government and the property owner needed to prove their cases 
by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to only the innocent 
owner having the higher burden of proof.75 CAFRA also allowed for 
indigent defendants to receive court appointed counsel, but only so long 
as the property at issue was real property used as a primary residence by 
the owner.76 
These changes seemed to significantly enhance due process protection 
for property owners. However, concerns surrounding the potential abuse 
of civil forfeiture persisted because the government’s burden of proof 
remained relatively low while the cost for a plaintiff to defend her 
property remained relatively high,77 excluding the narrow exception for 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 
(2012)). 
 70. Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 104–05 (2001) (listing the “substantial 
improvements” CAFRA made in addressing the due process protections of individuals). 
 71. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184 (“Prior to the enactment of 
CAFRA . . . [t]he government bore the minimal burden of demonstrating probable cause for 
instituting the forfeiture proceeding.”).  
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 73. See $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).  
 75. Prior to CAFRA, the government needed to demonstrate that the property was subject 
to civil forfeiture by a probable cause standard, and then the burden shifted to the property owner, 
who had to show that the property was not subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the 
evidence, a noticeably higher burden than the government’s. United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. 
Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A). 
 77. Specifically, the burden shifting model, in forcing the defendant to prove the 
“innocence” of the legally fictitious guilty property, still eliminates the usual presumption of 
innocence afforded in criminal forfeitures and criminal proceedings. Although CAFRA imposed 
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court-appointed counsel in the case of real property. Although Congress 
enacted CAFRA to lessen the government’s reach and enhance 
procedural protection for defendants, the government appeared to still 
wield an unbalanced power over individuals (particularly third parties) 
attempting to defend the confiscation of their property.78 CAFRA also 
allowed law enforcement agencies (specifically state law enforcement 
agencies) to keep up to 100% of the proceeds obtained through forfeiture, 
thus constructively incentivizing them to pursue the seizure of property.79  
Many states responded to these concerns surrounding civil forfeiture 
by enacting reformative legislation. These states have either heightened 
the burdens imposed on the government or substantially altered forfeiture 
procedures post-CAFRA. Since 2014, eleven states—New Mexico,80 
Nebraska,81 Maryland,82 Florida,83 Minnesota,84 Montana,85 Michigan,86 
                                                                                                                     
substantial reforms, it also placed great hardships on individuals in defending their property. 
Barnet, supra note 70, at 107 (“The claimant is left with the often insurmountable burden of 
proving innocence . . . because, as the fiction prescribes, it is the property itself and not the owner 
who is on trial. Because there is no criminal trial following the preponderance determination, the 
government enjoys a considerable advantage.”). 
 78. Id. (signaling that the personification of the “guilty property” that still exists in CAFRA 
conceals certain process protections for defendants by shifting the burden). 
 79. Crepelle, supra note 44, at 327.  
 80. H.B. 560, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015) (effectively abolishing civil forfeiture 
altogether and only allowing forfeiture of property upon criminal conviction). 
 81. L.B. 1106, 104th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2016) (constructively eliminating most civil 
forfeiture proceedings by requiring a criminal conviction associated with certain crimes and 
enhancing prosecutorial reporting requirements regarding forfeitures).  
 82. H.B. 336, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016) (raising the government’s burden of proof 
from a preponderance of the evidence to a clear and convincing evidence). 
 83. S.B. 1044, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016) (raising the evidentiary standard in 
contraband forfeiture actions to beyond a reasonable doubt, although a criminal conviction is still 
not required). 
 84. S.B. 874, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2014) (raising the state’s burden of proof to clear 
and convincing evidence). 
 85. H.B. 463, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015) (stating that the defendant must be 
convicted of a criminal offense giving rise to the forfeiture and that the state must prove the crime 
was connected to the property by clear and convincing evidence).  
 86. MICH. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
ASSET FORFEITURE IN MICHIGAN (2016) (raising the burden of proof to clear and convincing 
evidence and also instituting new reporting requirements for law enforcement to more effectively 
track forfeiture demographics). 
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New Hampshire,87 Georgia,88 Virginia,89 and Mississippi90—and 
Washington D.C.91 have passed some form of civil forfeiture reform. 
Notably, all of these pieces of legislation passed within the last four 
years.92 Additionally, during January 2017, a bill was introduced in the 
Indiana Senate proposing reforms including treating seized property 
where a person has asserted an ownership interest differently from seized 
property that was abandoned or unclaimed.93 The bill permitted seized 
property that was not abandoned or unclaimed to be forfeited to the state 
only if the person who owned or used the property has been convicted of 
a criminal offense, and repealed a provision permitting the state to turn 
over seized property to the federal government.94  
Although the bill’s progress halted in March 2017, the Indiana bill and 
the reforms enacted in eleven other states and Washington D.C. revealed 
a trend toward civil forfeiture reform. Summarily, states have attempted 
or are attempting to reform civil forfeiture by either raising the 
government’s burden of proof, altering the burden-shifting model to 
protect the defendant and place the burden solely on the government, or 
removing incentives from law enforcement by placing proceeds in 
                                                                                                                     
 87. S.B. 522, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2016) (requiring a criminal conviction in most 
cases and requiring law enforcement to return all assets seized to a general fund, thereby 
preventing law enforcement from keeping the proceeds). However, New Hampshire Public 
Radio later reported in 2018 that state law enforcement agencies were able to circumvent the 
criminal conviction requirement by calling federal law enforcements agencies to conduct the 
same seizure of property. See Todd Bookman, ‘Loophole’ Helps N.H. Law Enforcement Net 
Millions Through Civil Asset Forfeiture, N.H. PUB. RADIO, (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.nhpr.org/ 
post/loophole-helps-nh-law-enforcement-net-millions-through-civil-asset-forfeiture#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/BW73-4D55].   
 88. H.B. 233, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (creating a standardized reporting system 
for disclosing forfeiture actions by law enforcement, among other modifications to civil 
forfeiture). 
 89. S.B. 457, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (raising the burden to clear and convincing 
evidence). 
 90. H.B. 1410, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (creating a designated task force to 
review forfeiture cases and recommend legislative reforms).  
 91. B. 20-0048, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2013) (eliminating burden shifting model of 
proof in favor of placing the burden on the government instead of requiring the owner to prove 
her innocence).  
 92. The sudden increase in state legislation within the past five years may be attributable to 
the recent increase in news coverage detailing the victimization of individuals who attempted to 
fight civil forfeiture proceedings but failed due to a lack of adequate resources and support. See, 
e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/Z58Z-5ATE]. Narrative stories describing the 
severe effects on people’s lives when private property has been taken away from them can offer 
a “powerful catalyst for legislative change.” Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five 
Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil 
Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 714 (2011).  
 93. S.B. 8, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017). 
 94. Id. 
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general funds or disengaging from equitable sharing programs with the 
federal government.  
This turbulent history of civil forfeiture set the stage for a significant 
change brought on by the judiciary, as potentially foreshadowed by 
Justice Thomas in Leonard v. Texas.95 Forfeiture actions originated 
during the reign of the English Crown, where the religious rule conflated 
legality and assets were forfeited to atone for the wrongdoer’s actions and 
save the King’s soul.96 As English roots extended into the colonial legal 
system, forfeiture developed into a tool to seize property to both 
compensate the government and condemn the wrongdoer.97 Civil 
forfeiture remained mostly dormant for the following century until there 
was a drastic increase in anti-drug enforcement laws seeking to obtain the 
ill-gotten gains from drug transactions.98 As forfeitures increased through 
the 1980s, the courts clashed in defining the limits of civil forfeiture as 
exhibited in Austin and Bajakajian.99 Although Congress attempted to 
assuage civil forfeiture abuses in passing CAFRA,100 backlash over the 
government’s low burden of proof and the plaintiff’s seemingly 
impossible task of proving innocence continued. Post-CAFRA, various 
changes in state legislation indicated unrest surrounding forfeiture 
procedures, leading up to the Leonard statement that re-opened the door 
looking into the historical justifications for modern forfeiture.101 
Moreover, greater media coverage of civil forfeiture abuses in recent 
years has also captured the attention of lawmakers.102 Notably, in Justice 
Thomas’s statement in Leonard, he specifically cites a lengthy feature in 
the New Yorker that chronicled extensive abuses by law enforcement in 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017). Justice Thomas concluded the statement 
with, “Whether this Court's treatment of the broad modern forfeiture practice can be justified by 
the narrow historical one is certainly worthy of consideration in greater detail.” Id.   
 96. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 25 (“The same thing has remained true in England until well 
into this century, with regard even to inanimate objects. . . . It was to be given to God, that is to 
say to the Church, for the king, to be expended for the good of his soul.”).  
 97. See The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 
1, 15 (1827). 
 98. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 381. 
 99. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602, 604 (1992). 
 100. See Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War 
on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 706 (2014). 
 101. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017). 
 102. See Matt Ford, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil-Forfeiture Rules, 
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/sessions-
forfeiture-justice-department-civil/534168/ [https://perma.cc/J8M4-C62X]; Michael Sallah et 
al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/ 
investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/?utm_term=.78c17543fbf0 [https://perma.cc/A6V7-
J7WS]; Nick Wing, Florida Just Made It Harder for Police to Take People’s Stuff, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-civil-asset-forfeiture_us_ 
56fe9d7ce4b0a06d5805896d [https://perma.cc/7WGR-3XXU].  
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taking property from poor and working class citizens.103 The breadth of 
coverage reporting on civil asset forfeiture abuses reflects a poignant 
historical moment where extensive and zealous journalism challenged the 
law to change.  
This unsettled history and the growing trend toward reformation 
signals that either the judiciary or legislature may seek to enact larger 
changes in forfeiture law in the near future. The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari on June 18, 2018, in Timbs v. Indiana,104 
looking at whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local 
authorities.105 Some media outlets have predicted that Timbs is the 
Supreme Court’s opportunity to end civil asset forfeiture;106 however, 
regardless of the Timbs outcome, the case will extend the Austin and 
Bajakaijan dialogue. Therefore, Austin and Bajakaijan will continue to 
have a significant impact on the standard that state law enforcement 
agencies must abide by when implementing potentially devastating 
proprietary punishments like civil asset forfeitures. Media attention 
focusing on abuse through civil forfeiture and celebrating the passage of 
reformation also suggests a strengthening push for reform.107 Legal 
scholars have thus proposed various solutions to mitigate due process 
concerns and the problematic pace of forfeiture proceedings.  
III.  POTENTIAL PROPOSALS FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE REFORM AND 
THEIR VIABILITY 
Over the last twenty years, many legal scholars have proposed 
different solutions to address the multi-faceted concerns arising out of 
civil forfeiture. Part III of this Note will look at the most significant 
solutions that have been proposed and analyze the major arguments 
behind them to determine their potential viability.  
                                                                                                                     
 103. Stillman, supra, note 92.  
 104. 138 S. Ct. 2650 (2018).  
 105. See State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1180–81 (Ind. 2017), cert. granted, Timbs v. 
Indiana, 138 S. Ct. 2650 (2018). 
 106. See Jibran Khan, Property Rights Get Their Day in Court, NAT’L REV. (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/civil-asset-forfeiture-timbs-indiana-could-end/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7GE-LE2A].  
 107. See Wing, supra note 102; Nick Sibilla, Washington, D.C. Council Votes to Reform 
City's Civil Forfeiture Laws, Ban Policing for Profit, FORBES MAG. (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/12/03/washington-d-c-council-votes-to-
reform-citys-civil-forfeiture-laws-ban-policing-for-profit/#2a7b6c263010l [https://perma.cc/ 
JVM8-S89N]; Jason Snead, How a New Hampshire Law Will Protect Private Property from 
Government Seizure, DAILY SIGNAL (June 3, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/03/how-a-
new-hampshire-law-will-protect-private-property-from-government-seizure/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BJ2U-UFCL]. 
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A.  Raising the Government’s Burden of Proof 
As exhibited by many of the states that have enacted civil forfeiture 
reform,108 raising the government’s burden of proof provides a relatively 
easy way for the legislature to restrain the excessive and expedient nature 
of forfeiture actions. By raising the evidentiary standard from a 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence or 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the legislature would effectively 
require the government to conduct further investigation and expend 
additional resources in proving property’s “guilt.”  
By raising the evidentiary standard to beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
legislature would constructively abolish civil forfeiture because the 
prosecution would have to meet the highest legal standard—one 
traditionally associated with criminal law—simply to confiscate 
property. The prosecution would no longer benefit from bringing civil 
and criminal forfeiture actions simultaneously, because both burdens 
would be high and the facts needed to prove the property’s criminality 
would significantly overlap with those required to prove the defendant’s 
guilt.109 Procedurally, a criminal and a civil forfeiture action regarding 
the same property would ultimately be costly and inefficient. This change 
in the legal standard would eliminate the procedural expediency of civil 
forfeiture, which currently allows for the acquisition of “guilty property” 
without proving the guilt of the person. Because criminal forfeiture 
actions are embedded with significantly more due process safeguards for 
the property and property owner than are civil forfeiture actions,110 the 
effects of raising the government’s burden to beyond a reasonable doubt 
would ultimately reduce many due process concerns by pushing 
forfeiture actions into the realm of criminal law.  
                                                                                                                     
 108. New Mexico, Nebraska, Maryland, Florida, Minnesota, Montana, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, and Washington D.C. have enacted civil forfeiture reform either raising the burden of 
proof to clear and convincing evidence or to beyond a reasonable doubt. In raising the 
government’s burden to beyond a reasonable doubt, those states have constructively or actually 
eliminated civil forfeiture altogether in favor of criminal forfeiture, which includes the 
significantly greater due process protections applied to criminal prosecutions.   
 109. Logically, in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was used in or derived 
from a criminal act, the prosecutor would have to prove to the highest legal standard that a criminal 
act occurred, which by extension would involve proving the criminal acts of the defendant. 
Because the facts would be the same, it would no longer be procedurally efficient to bring two 
separate actions. But see Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 183, 226 (1996) (citing several “mundane” reasons prosecutors bring parallel proceedings, 
such as a lack of knowledge between the civil and criminal attorneys about which actions the 
other is bringing in regards to the case).   
 110. Historically, the term “parallel proceedings” refers to prosecuting both civil and 
criminal forfeiture actions simultaneously, and the potential for merging these two proceedings 
has been considered by scholars since the contentious judicial changes in Austin. See Martin, 
supra note 20, at 682–85. 
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Under the umbrella of raising the burden of proof in court 
proceedings, some legal scholars have also suggested other requirements, 
such as needing a warrant to seize property.111 This requirement attempts 
to eliminate law enforcement’s ability to seize property without an 
accompanying arrest. A warrant requirement would effectively nudge 
civil forfeiture law closer to criminal forfeiture law by requiring a 
simultaneous criminal case instead of allowing a civil forfeiture action to 
stand alone. The legislature could impose this requirement; however, no 
states have passed any legislation to this effect.  
Although the Fourth Amendment attaches certain protections to 
homes and curtilages in an effort to respect an individual’s right to 
privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not traditionally protect the privacy 
of property itself.112 In theory, implementing a warrant requirement 
would strengthen the “substantial connection” of property to illegal 
criminal acts113 and therefore limit law enforcement’s ability to seize 
some property.114 However, many forfeitable items, such as contraband 
and other items that constitute evidence of criminal activity, can be seized 
without a warrant because their presence constitutes exigent 
circumstances.115 Because property can function as exigent 
circumstances during a lawful warrantless search, it is unlikely that a 
warrant requirement would be effective in offering greater protection to 
defendants and property owners. Given this well-established precedent 
and the lack of legislative action proposing a warrant requirement in civil 
forfeitures, it seems unlikely that this proposal will succeed.  
Additionally, other legal scholars have proposed a differentiating-
burden-approach—imposing different burdens of proof depending on the 
category of property. One scholar proposed three classifications for 
property subject to forfeiture: contraband, proceeds, and facilitating 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Crepelle, supra note 44, at 357 (“If law enforcement cannot obtain a warrant, an arrest 
should have to be made in conjunction with the seizure. After all, when law enforcement seizes 
cash or property and lets the owner go, either a criminal is let loose or an innocent person has her 
property confiscated.”). 
 112. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (noting that the touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2012).  
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 115. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 (1977) (holding that the Constitution allows 
warrantless searches of property if law enforcement has probable cause to believe that the property 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime).  
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property.116 Forfeitures of contraband117 would necessitate a low burden 
of proof, even as low as probable cause, given the inherent illegality of 
contraband;118 proceeds would be evaluated by the preponderance of the 
evidence standard or higher;119  forfeitures against facilitating property—
commonly known as the instrumentalities of crime, such as cash—would 
be abolished, because these types of forfeitures tend to lead to the most 
flagrant abuses and injustices.120 Another scholar who acknowledged the 
differentiating-burden-approach121 further recognized that the divide 
between the government’s burden of proof in civil and criminal forfeiture 
cases is a continuing source of injustice.122 The strategy behind the 
differentiating-burden-approach works toward eliminating due process 
concerns. For example, if civil forfeitures over properties like cash were 
altogether abolished, law enforcement would no longer have the 
heightened incentive to confiscate property and take advantage of 
individuals who are incapable of defending their property against 
forfeiture actions. However, as expressed previously, given the lack of 
communication between civil and criminal prosecutors and the existing 
confusion surrounding the arcane laws of forfeiture,123 an approach 
involving three different burdens may only add to the confusion in 
pursuing civil forfeitures cases. As such, raising the burden of proof 
uniformly for all property subject to forfeiture may be the more 
procedurally efficient way to safeguard against abuses, particularly as 
reflected by the actions in state legislatures.124  
When CAFRA raised the burden of proof from probable cause to a 
preponderance of the evidence, it implicitly acknowledged that the 
burden on the government is one of the problematic aspects of forfeiture 
cases. Although altering the probable cause warrant requirement does not 
appear to be a viable option for change, legislative action to raise the 
burden of proof could be an easy way to add an institutional safeguard in 
forfeiture proceedings. 
                                                                                                                     
 116. David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 
13 NEV. L.J. 1, 55 (2012).  
 117. An item qualifies as contraband when its incriminating nature is immediately apparent. 
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983).  
 118. Pimentel, supra note 116, at 55–56. 
 119. Id. at 56. 
 120. Id. at 57. Professor Pimentel also points out that even with raising the burden, 
particularly in the forfeiture of proceeds, forfeiture abuses will likely continue, given the incentive 
for law enforcement to seize property because they directly benefit from the forfeitures.  
 121. Bridy, supra note 100.  
 122. Id. at 707.  
 123. Klein, supra note 109. 
 124. See supra note 108 (listing all of the possible states).  
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B.  A Right to Counsel in All Civil Forfeiture Proceedings 
CAFRA opened the door for a more expansive right to court-
appointed counsel when it allowed some indigent claimants to receive 
counsel if the forfeited property was real property used as a primary 
residence.125 Additionally, CAFRA allowed a person to use her court-
appointed counsel that had previously been assigned in a related criminal 
proceeding.126 When contemplating extending of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to individuals contesting civil forfeiture actions, the 
House directly acknowledged that civil forfeiture actions “are so punitive 
in nature that appointed counsel should be made available for those who 
are indigent, or made indigent by a seizure, in appropriate 
circumstances.”127 The House also recognized that many individuals 
probably chose to refrain from challenging forfeiture actions, not because 
they were guilty, but because without the assistance of counsel the costs 
associated with legal action were too expensive for individuals to 
afford.128 Although Congress chose to extend the right to assistance of 
counsel only to those individuals with a related criminal case and cases 
involving the forfeiture of a primary residence, this compromise shows 
the partial extension of constitutional protection to individuals contesting 
civil forfeitures. The House’s reasoning reflects civil forfeiture’s 
confusing and hybrid nature—civil forfeiture is deeply intertwined with 
criminal punishments that have devastating consequences on people’s 
lives. However, because there is no possibility of prison time,129 
forfeiture actions remained bound to the looser procedural demands of 
civil law. As a result, CAFRA embodied many half-measures, like the 
partial right to counsel that compromised constitutional protections.130 
This allowed civil forfeiture actions to continue as civil actions without 
accompanying criminal cases despite the integral component of illegality 
to civil forfeiture cases. 
If state legislatures or Congress extended the right to court-appointed 
counsel to all indigent individuals contesting civil forfeiture proceedings, 
civil forfeiture actions would be pushed closer toward criminal law.131 
                                                                                                                     
 125. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 126. Id. § 983(b)(1)(A); see also Barnet, supra note 70, at 105 (noting that these changes in 
court-appointed counsel served as a large step in enhancing due process protections but that the 
legislation still left many indigent claimants without a right to counsel). 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14 (1999). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (suggesting that the House cannot extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
all civil forfeiture cases because the parties are not threatened with imprisonment). 
 130. Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202 
(2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)). 
 131. Louis S. Rulli, Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform: Providing Lawyers for 
the Poor and Recapturing Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Communities, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 507, 513–14 (1998) (describing how civil forfeiture proceedings share a strong resemblance 
 
17
Milliron: Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil A
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
2018] ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 1396 
 
This would give the most vulnerable populations an enhanced 
constitutional protection, as they would have the means to challenge 
forfeiture actions brought against them.132 However, this remedy only 
extends to a limited population, and it fails to address situations where 
law enforcement confiscates valuable property from an individual who 
would incur great expense contesting the forfeiture.133 Extending the right 
to counsel would protect one of the most vulnerable populations in civil 
forfeiture proceedings,134 but it is likely that the vast majority of forfeiture 
cases will still go unchallenged because of the financial burden and risk 
of contesting it. 
Although the Court acknowledged that civil forfeitures are “quasi-
criminal proceedings” that can function punitively135 and the House 
acknowledged their harsh punitive nature,136 the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel is historically bound to criminal cases.137 Because state 
legislatures have yet to extend the right to counsel in civil forfeiture 
cases,138 and given the House’s direct rejection of extending the right to 
counsel in CAFRA,139 this reform proposal seems unlikely to sway 
legislatures. It would also be less effective in addressing due process 
concerns because many forfeitures would likely remain unchallenged.  
C.  Significant Changes in Drug Laws and Drug 
Enforcement Oversight 
Forfeiture actions reignited during the 1970s and 1980s when the 
government sharpened its focus on drug enforcement.140 The Controlled 
                                                                                                                     
to criminal proceedings, and yet the lack of counsel creates substantial confusion for indigent 
homeowners going through the legal process alone).  
 132. One author requested information from the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), the 
entity that provides counsel to individuals under CAFRA, for the number of court-appointed 
attorneys assigned to homeowners in civil forfeiture actions from 2000–2007. See Rulli, supra 
note 92, at 745. LSC reported that it only appointed counsel twenty-eight times in the seven-year 
period. Id. Roughly applying the broad statistic that eighty percent of civil forfeitures are 
uncontested, the author estimated that roughly twenty-four of the twenty-eight cases would have 
gone uncontested if the homeowners had not received court-appointed counsel. Id. As such, the 
nature of court-appointed counsel significantly expands a person’s right to challenge the forfeiture 
of personal property without incurring great and unfair expense. 
 133. See Stillman, supra note 92 (detailing extensive accounts of individuals who were 
unable to defend their property).  
 134. In Leonard, Justice Thomas recognized the poor as one of the most vulnerable 
populations. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017). 
 135. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993). 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14 (1999). 
 137. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
 138. See supra note 108. 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14. 
 140. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic 
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 55 (1998) (“What forfeiture does do well is raise money. Police 
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Substances Act141 triggered an increase in forfeitures, primarily those 
connected to drug crimes.142 Although there are no formal or fully 
comprehensive statistics about the number of forfeitures directly 
connected to drug crimes,143 because the Controlled Substances Act 
specifically allowed the use of civil forfeitures, it is clear that many 
forfeitures are intimately tied to drug crimes. Additionally, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) functions as one of the primary 
branches of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in using civil forfeitures to 
ferret out drug activity.144 This modern practice of enforcing drug laws 
by using forfeitures statutorily—primarily by using organizations like the 
DEA—shows how forfeitures are still intertwined with the changing 
attitudes and efforts toward low-level drug enforcement.  
Currently, there is a national movement toward ameliorating the harsh 
consequences of the War on Drugs, particularly on low-level drug 
offenders.145 The Obama Administration began shifting drug 
enforcement efforts away from incarceration and toward rehabilitation 
and treatment by reducing the sentences of hundreds of federal prisoners 
and spending more money on drug treatment.146 In addition to the federal 
government’s relaxed enforcement of drug laws, many states also relaxed 
                                                                                                                     
and prosecutors argue that 21 USC § 881 enables them to carry out ordinary law enforcement 
business and raise money at the same time—to do well by doing good.” (footnote omitted)).  
 141. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 (2012)). 
 142. See generally United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 
2015) (affirming the forfeiture of cash acquired during a traffic stop where the defendant 
consented to the use of a drug-sniffing dog, even though no drugs were found); United States v. 
427 & 429 Hall Street, 74 F.3d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming the forfeiture of a grocery 
store because defendant’s charge was premised on intent to distribute even though he was only 
convicted of a misdemeanor possession charge); United States v. $21,055.00 in U.S. Currency, 
778 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1102 (D. Kan. 2011) (affirming the forfeiture of cash found in a driver’s 
truck bed because it was associated with a drug transaction, even though no drug transaction was 
proven).  
 143. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S 
OVERSIGHT OF CASH SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE ACTIVITIES (2017) (recommending the DEA 
develop a more comprehensive system for tracking data on forfeitures to more accurately 
determine if civil liberty abuses are occurring).  
 144. DEA Asset Forfeiture, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., 
https://www.dea.gov/ops/af.shtml [https://perma.cc/BZT2-SHJJ].  
 145. In 2014, the DOJ announced a clemency initiative where it encouraged federal prisoners 
to seek a pardon from the President, if they were nonviolent low-level offenders who did not have 
significant ties to larger drug organizations.  
 146. See German Lopez, How Obama Quietly Reshaped America’s War on Drugs, VOX (Jan. 
19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/12/19/13903532/obama-war-on-drugs-legacy 
[https://perma.cc/U4Q5-JRXW]; German Lopez, Obama’s Drug Czar: “We can’t arrest and 
incarcerate addiction out of people,” VOX (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2015/12/14/10106372/drug-czar-michael-botticelli [https://perma.cc/AF23-KMVT] 
(using figures from the Office of National Drug Control Policy to illustrate increased spending on 
treatment and prevention from 2003 to 2015). 
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sentencing laws for low-level drug offenses or decriminalized the 
possession of marijuana.147 The DOJ and individual states have also 
begun to move away from mandatory-minimum sentencing structures 
(which arose from the War on Drugs during the 1980s) to more efficiently 
sentence and punish repeat offenders and to prevent nonviolent drug 
offenders from serving lengthy, expensive prison sentences.148 American 
attitudes about low-level drugs like marijuana have also changed: 
Approximately 64% of Americans supported the legalization of 
marijuana use in October 2017.149 In light of this national trend over the 
past ten years—a trend in favor of legalizing marijuana use and reducing 
mandatory-minimum sentences150—the use of civil asset forfeitures 
could also decrease. Although there is minimal data tracking the number 
of forfeitures generally,151 let alone the number of forfeitures connected 
to  drug encounters, low-level drug offenses provide one of the greatest 
opportunities for law enforcement to use civil forfeiture to confiscate cash 
and property from vulnerable communities.152 If state and federal law 
enforcement no longer prioritized prosecuting these offenses, civil 
forfeitures would likely decrease given their close connection to low-
level drug offenses.  
If the country’s cultural focus shifts from the War on Drugs 
initiative—which caused the prison population to increase over 500% by 
the 1990s153—toward more treatment-based approaches to drug crimes, 
civil forfeitures are likely to decrease since they commonly occur in 
                                                                                                                     
 147. As of January 2018, nine states have legalized marijuana, fourteen states have removed 
jail time for possessing small amounts of marijuana (not counting the previous nine), and twelve 
states allow medical marijuana (still not counting the previous nine states where marijuana is 
legal). State Policy, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/states/ 
[https://perma.cc/PYW3-6AQF].  
 148. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, In Milestone for Sentencing Reform, Attorney General 
Holder Announces Record Reduction in Mandatory Minimums Against Nonviolent Drug 
Offenders (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/milestone-sentencing-reform-
attorney-general-holder-announces-record-reduction-mandatory [https://perma.cc/39DV-2M26]. 
 149. Justin McCarthy, Record High Support for Legalizing Marijuana Use in U.S., 
GALLUP (Oct. 25, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/221018/record-high-support-legalizing-
marijuana.aspx [https://perma.cc/6PCJ-6LYB] (interpreting the 2017 Gallup Poll which showed 
increasing support for marijuana legalization from 34% in 2002 to 64% in 2017).  
 150. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROSECUTION AND SENTENCING REFORM PRINCIPLES UNDER THE SMART ON 
CRIME INITIATIVE (2017) (reviewing how the Smart on Crime initiative by former Attorney 
General Eric Holder functioned in releasing low-level offenders from federal prison). 
 151. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.  
 152. Timothy Williams, Marijuana Arrests Outnumber Those for Violent Crimes, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/marijuana-
arrests.html [https://perma.cc/DM5L-SDBD] (exploring how the prosecution of low-level drug 
offenses disproportionately targets poor, African Americans).  
 153. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 6 (2012).  
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tandem with these offenses.154 A reduction in civil forfeitures 
corresponding to the de-emphasis on incarcerating individuals for low-
level offenses would alleviate the burden on the most vulnerable 
populations—particularly poor or minority communities—to contest 
forfeitures of property and assert innocent ownership. Poor and minority 
communities are disproportionately affected by civil forfeitures because 
the process of  contesting a forfeiture or asserting innocence requires 
spending time and money that likely outweighs the value of the forfeited 
thing itself.155 The executive branch and state legislatures have made 
significant moves towards decriminalizing low-level offenses like the 
possession of marijuana. Given that civil forfeitures arose alongside the 
persecution of low-level drug offenders, it follows that forfeitures are 
likely to fall with the decriminalization and de-emphasis on prosecuting 
those same crimes.  
However, this movement in reforming low-level drugs laws may 
pause during the Trump Administration. Upon entering office, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions increased two major criminal justice initiatives that 
run counter to these national trends.156 First, Sessions announced that he 
intended to increase the enforcement of laws dealing with low-level drug 
crimes involving marijuana, and further that he intended to research the 
connection between violent crime and marijuana.157 Additionally, 
Sessions announced his intent to increase civil forfeiture actions.158 The 
resurgence of these initiatives potentially opens the door for an increase 
in forfeiture actions as an easy procedural substitute for prosecuting low-
level drug crimes that typically involve cash.159 This potential increase 
could incentivize law enforcement officers to seek out more low-level 
offenders and confiscate more property, property that is hard to defend 
and hard to prove innocent ownership over.160 Although Sessions’s 
initiatives reflect the attitudes that motivated the War on Drugs, the DOJ 
and other federal agencies may still enact progressive changes to 
safeguard against civil forfeiture abuse by increasing internal oversight 
that will ensure fair law enforcement practices.  
                                                                                                                     
 154. David Pimentel, Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the 
Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 541, 542 
(2017) (noting how the war on drugs directly caused the massive increase in civil forfeitures). 
 155. Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment 
Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1111, 1157 (2017) (noting that even when identical conduct occurs, poor families are 
far more likely to lose their homes compared to wealthier families). 
 156. Sarah Stillman, Jeff Sessions and the Resurgence of Civil-Asset Forfeiture, NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/jeff-sessions-and-the-
resurgence-of-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/9J33-Q8A4]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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For example, the Office of the Inspector General periodically 
investigates and audits the use of civil asset forfeitures by the federal 
government,161 particularly in response to concerns about lack of judicial 
and governmental oversight.162 The Inspector General’s 2017 Report 
specifically referenced concerns about the use of forfeiture, especially as 
a tool “to seize and forfeit cash or property without independent judicial 
oversight and without charging the owner or possessor of the cash or 
property with a crime.”163 Additionally, the report acknowledged that 
federal equitable sharing programs have enabled state law enforcement 
agencies to circumvent their own state laws in an effort to receive a 
greater share of the forfeiture proceedings.164 The report also found that 
the DEA did not measure how its forfeitures advanced criminal 
investigations,165 that the DEA may have posed substantial risks to civil 
liberties by seizing cash that may not have been related to criminal 
investigations,166 and that there were no standard requirements for state 
and local task force officers to receive training in civil forfeitures.167  
This timely acknowledgment of these concerns reflects the bipartisan 
political tension that exists surrounding forfeiture regulations. The 
Inspector General’s almost exclusive focus on the DEA also supports the 
undeniable link between ferreting out drug crimes and civil forfeiture as 
a prominent tool in law enforcement’s arsenal. Although legislative 
                                                                                                                     
 161. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND 
AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016) 
(providing a forfeiture audit report for 2015); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE 
ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016) (providing a forfeiture audit report for 2016). 
 162. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 143 (stating that concerns 
have been raised about the use of asset forfeiture).  
 163. Id. at i. 
 164. Id. 
 165. The DOJ has consistently expressed concerns about a lack of consistent reporting and 
record-keeping within the DEA. In collecting data about the DEA’s use of asset forfeiture in 
connection with criminal matters, the data may reveal whether the DEA is using asset forfeiture 
to deter and punish criminal behavior or for other purposes that could potentially raise civil 
liberties concerns. Id. at iii.  
 166. The DOJ recommended collecting data on the relationship between asset seizures and 
criminal investigations to create a clearer picture, including details like the circumstances under 
which forfeitures occurred and the benefits law enforcement derived from the seizures. Id. at 63. 
In evaluating such specific details about the civil tool of criminal law enforcement, the DOJ is 
clearly working to enhance its oversight and regulation of civil forfeiture practices. This potential 
for greater oversight could lead to more internal regulation and self-policing of civil forfeitures, 
which may be a more realistic resolution to the challenges impeding forfeiture reform. 
 167. The DOJ recommended that the DEA review its seizure practices to determine if more 
training or specific policies were needed for law enforcement to enforce procedures consistently. 
Id. at 64. The DOJ focused on consistency as a means of garnering public trust because 
“[h]andling similar matters consistently in seizure operations is necessary to avoid the risk of 
creating the appearance that decisions in these sensitive operations are arbitrary.” Id.  
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action to change drug laws would likely be one of the most significant 
ways to remove law enforcement’s incentive to abuse civil forfeiture 
actions, the prospect of these changes is uncertain.168 Thus, executive 
agency enaction of greater oversight, like that instituted by the Inspector 
General, or greater pressure on federal agencies and state and local law 
enforcement to carefully regulate their own activities, is a more realistic 
potential outcome. Political pressure on the DOJ appears to have 
increased oversight of forfeiture actions within the last several years,169 
and continued political pressure on these agencies may spur them into 
more careful regulations and record keeping.  
The undeniable link between drug laws and civil forfeiture suggests 
potential civil forfeiture reform by reforming drug laws themselves. The 
national movement appears to push towards decriminalizing marijuana 
use and ameliorating overly stringent drug laws, particularly those related 
to low-level offenses. However, given the resurgence of increased 
penalties for drug laws and asset forfeitures under the current 
administration, progress may have to occur independently within law 
enforcement agencies in the meantime. If law enforcement agencies, both 
federally and state-wide, establish clearer record keeping practices 
related to the number and characteristics of asset forfeitures, while more 
carefully monitoring how these actions impact the civil liberties of 
defendants, civil forfeitures may decrease; vigilance about the procedural 
fairness of forfeitures may increase simultaneously. 
D.  Reallocating Forfeited Assets to a General Restitution Fund 
One of the most problematic aspects of civil forfeitures involves law 
enforcement agencies’ abilities to pocket the assets forfeited.170 Equitable 
sharing programs, where states may retain a certain percentage of the 
                                                                                                                     
 168. On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum rescinding  
previous guidance relaxing marijuana enforcement nationwide. Memorandum from Jefferson B. 
Sessions, Office of the Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018). 
Sessions specifically cited 21 U.S.C. § 801, the Controlled Substances Act, which ignited the civil 
forfeiture enforcement, and advised that this Act should serve as a basis for prosecuting marijuana 
use and other crimes. Id. Sessions’s memorandum, among numerous other statements, appears to 
halt the national movement towards legalizing marijuana.  
 169. In response to the 2014 report, several prominent news sources began to focus on the 
large amount of money the government obtained from individuals without due process. See 
generally Christopher Ingraham, Law Enforcement Took More Stuff from People than Burglars 
Did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/?utm_term= 
.55a8967586d1 [https://perma.cc/DD7X-NSY5] (discussing how the Treasury and Justice 
Department deposited more than $5 billion into their asset forfeiture funds).  
 170. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, ASSET 
FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL (2016) (the equitable sharing program enables this profit sharing 
system between the federal government and states to occur), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
afmls/file/839521/download [https://perma.cc/DH3V-MUDH].  
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forfeited assets while providing some of the assets to the federal 
government, create a rare system where federal and state law enforcement 
agencies derive benefits from the smallest of crimes.171 Although many 
law enforcement agencies use a portion of the funds to improve their local 
offices by spending money on valuable items, such as training and 
improved equipment,172 numerous news outlets have reported that some 
officers have pocketed the proceeds directly or spent the assets on lavish, 
unnecessary items for the agencies.173  
The issue with this profit-sharing system is that it—intentionally or 
unintentionally—motivates law enforcement to seek out opportunities to 
take property, even when there is little suspicion of criminal activity. 
Because there is a direct and tangible benefit from apprehending a person, 
and because the person’s cash could be associated with crime, officers 
can confiscate property when there is no reason or practical motivation 
for such a forfeiture.174 As such, equitable sharing programs incentivize 
law enforcement to seek out more opportunities to confiscate property, 
leaving greater potential for due process abuses and the inability of 
people to defend their property. Regardless of whether an officer actually 
confiscated property based on wrongful motive, the simple fact that an 
officer could have profit-seeking motives fosters public distrust of law 
enforcement.175 Law enforcement functions as a public service to aid 
society and remove criminals—not to profit off of the citizens it 
protects.176 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 140, at 51 (describing how states may receive 80% of 
the assets forfeited to the federal government, creating a system in which both entities profit).  
 172. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., Asset Seizure Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-
spending/?utm_term=.71f469bff1bb [https://perma.cc/Y2AU-SZN3] (describing use of assets for 
overtime pay, file cabinets, fitness gear, weapons, and surveillance systems). 
 173. See also Erin Fuchs, Here Are the Ridiculous Things Cops Bought with Cash ‘Seized’ 
From Americans, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-what-
police-bought-with-civil-forfeiture-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/WR9A-LV4P] (describing 
purchases, such as a $5 million dollar helicopter for the Los Angeles Police, a $1 million dollar 
command bus for a small department in Georgia, an expensive coffee maker, and a clown). 
 174. In Arizona, a federal judge recently allowed a case challenging the constitutionality of 
the profit motive in civil asset forfeiture laws to move forward. Order at 16–17, Cox v. Voyles, 
No. CV-15-01386-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. 2017). 
 175. Rulli, supra note 155, at 1120 (“The very authorities entrusted with discretion over 
when to use civil forfeiture laws now had a direct financial stake in the outcome of the cases they 
filed. . . . The explosion of civil forfeiture cases has brought with it persistent allegations of 
abuse.”). 
 176. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 details the specific oath of office for entering the civil service arena 
must swear to the following: “[T]hat I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States . . . that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; 
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.” 
(emphasis added).  
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Removing the profit incentive would likely strengthen public trust in 
law enforcement and help avoid potential cases of forfeiture abuse 
infringing on the due process rights of citizens. Several states have shifted 
away from equitable sharing programs and instead funnel the assets 
acquired into other funds.177 For example, Maine diverts most property 
to a “General Fund,” which is the primary operating fund of the Maine 
State Government, as opposed to funneling civil asset proceeds to the 
local law enforcement agency that acquired the property.178 Louisiana 
established a compromise system. In Louisiana, 60% of the forfeiture 
assets go to the law enforcement agency that seized the property, 20% 
goes to the district attorney’s office that handled the forfeiture action, and 
20% goes to a criminal court fund.179 Although this arrangement may still 
encourage law enforcement and prosecutors to pursue forfeiture cases,  
the fact that some of the funds go to  criminal court alleviates some 
pressure on the agencies.   
Additionally, Maryland requires that state law enforcement agencies 
dispose of the property, keep it for official use, and pay any proceeds 
from the sale of forfeited property to the state’s general fund.180 Maryland 
places limits on how much a seizing or prosecuting authority may directly 
or indirectly transfer to a federal law enforcement agency.181 It also 
requires the Governor to devote 20% of the proceeds deposited in the 
state’s General Fund for the purpose of funding drug treatment and 
education programs.182 Maryland offers a comprehensive model for 
removing profit-motivated policing. Although it leaves some room for 
law enforcement, particularly local agencies, to retain some of the funds, 
it successfully uses forfeited proceeds for the benefit of all citizens and 
even uses the proceeds for preventative programs like drug treatment.    
If these assets are diverted into general restitution funds to address the 
financial needs of crime victims, profit incentives would be reduced and 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See the following examples: Maine, Louisiana, Maryland, and New Mexico.  
 178. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 5824 (2018) (stating that any forfeited asset must either go to the 
General Fund of the state or, if approved by the proper entity, the forfeited property may be 
equitably transferred). 
 179. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2616 (2018) (detailing this breakdown of funds). 
 180. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-403 (West 2018). 
 181. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-212 (West 2018) (“A seizing authority or prosecuting 
authority may not directly or indirectly transfer seized property to a federal law enforcement 
authority or agency unless: (1) a criminal case related to the seizure is prosecuted in the federal 
court system under federal law; (2) the owner of the property consents to the forfeiture; (3) the 
property is cash of at least $50,000; or (4) the seizing authority transfers the property to a federal 
authority under a federal seizure warrant issued to take custody of assets originally seized under 
State law.”). 
 182. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-405 (West 2018). 
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those directly affected by crimes would receive a greater chance to heal 
and move forward.183  
For example, in New Mexico, the state legislature reformed civil 
forfeiture laws in 2015 by requiring a criminal conviction before law 
enforcement can seize the property. This established a clear and 
convincing evidence standard by shifting the innocent-owner burden onto 
government and sent 100% of the proceeds to the state’s general fund.184 
Although New Mexico has struggled with some local agencies refusing 
to turn over forfeited assets,185 this legislative reform exemplifies how 
states can reject the federal government’s equitable sharing program and 
remove police incentive to pursue lucrative but often less important 
cases.186  
The funds could also funnel into drug treatment and rehabilitation 
programs, particularly given the recent opioid crisis plaguing the United 
States.187 The federal government ignited the War on Drugs in a public 
effort to prevent the spread of rampant addiction primarily among 
youths.188 However, if the government and state agencies truly seek to 
alleviate drug use, these entities should continue the Obama 
Administration’s efforts to treat drug addiction medicinally rather than 
criminally.189 In doing so, the government could use the funds obtained 
from asset forfeiture programs to financially support programs that 
actually help citizens break free from addiction and continue on to lead 
healthier, more productive lives. 
There is no single “right answer” to the question of where funds 
derived from forfeitures should go, but any of these options could help 
eliminate the profit-sharing system that currently exists. By removing the 
incentive of profit from law enforcement, there is a greater chance that 
                                                                                                                     
 183. This could occur either through a general restitution fund, which could fund state crime 
victim compensation programs, or it could be used to pay restitution costs directly to a victim in 
a criminal case.  
 184. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015). 
 185. Martin Kaste, New Mexico Ended Civil Asset Forfeiture. Why Then Is It Still 
Happening?, NPR (June 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481058641/new-mexico-
ended-civil-asset-forfeiture-why-then-is-it-still-happening [https://perma.cc/MZF8-TTKC] 
(describing an incident in which a woman’s car was still confiscated by the police without a 
conviction). 
 186. Pimentel, supra note 154, at 554. 
 187. Haeyoun Park & Matthew Bloch, How the Epidemic of Drug Overdose Deaths Rippled 
Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/07/ 
us/drug-overdose-deaths-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/CVZ6-ZY2N] (graphically tracking the 
sharp increase in deaths due to opioid overdoses since 1999). 
 188. In The New Jim Crow, Alexander argued that the rhetoric surrounding the War on Drugs 
was actually a racial conversation further marginalizing black and brown people. ALEXANDER, 
supra note 153, at 58. This Note does not discount this valid proposition. Rather, this Note seeks 
to use the federal government’s rhetoric against it, primarily in an effort to actually work towards 
more effective drug interdiction. 
 189. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 150, at 1. 
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public trust in officers would increase, while there would also be a lower 
risk of officers using forfeiture to circumvent the due process rights of 
citizens—either intentionally or unintentionally—to bring home a few 
extra dollars.  
CONCLUSION 
Civil asset forfeiture is an unnatural amalgamation of criminal and 
civil law. Although civil forfeiture can be used to punish individuals for 
criminal acts,190 the high standard of due process protection does not 
extend to individuals who attempt to contest civil forfeitures. 
Additionally, law enforcement officers are incentivized to use this hybrid 
prosecutorial tool to acquire assets because the officers benefit directly 
from the assets. Thus, many individuals are unable to defend their 
property or assert their innocent ownership over their property. Because 
property can be an intimate and valuable extension of one’s self and 
ability to survive,191 the impact of civil forfeiture can lead to devastating 
consequences.  
Justice Thomas has seemingly opened the door for further 
conversation about the future of civil forfeiture and whether it can survive 
under modern standards of practice.192 There are varied proposals for 
ameliorating the harsh effects and injustices precipitated by civil 
forfeitures. The only guaranteed solution to these problems is abolishing 
civil forfeiture altogether; this would be possible by using only criminal 
forfeiture, since the criminal context triggers the highest standards of 
procedural due process.  But other proposals may also have lasting effects 
that could provide at least some due process protection for communities 
most affected by forfeitures. Although a statutory change to raise the 
burden of proof on the government offers the simplest solution, other 
changes—especially when combined—like altering drug laws, 
appointing counsel, and disincentivizing law enforcement can all have a 
potentially lasting impact in protecting the due process rights of citizens. 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993). 
 191. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (1765) (“There 
is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as 
the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”). 
 192. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017). 
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